



# **American Society of Dermatologic Surgery Association (ASDSA) and American Society for Laser Medicine & Surgery (ASLMS) Guidance for Cosmetic Dermatology Practices During COVID-19**

**Based on information available as of 10 June 2020**

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While dermatology practices have always followed optimal safety measures to protect and minimize infections for both patients, staff, and providers, the present COVID-19 environment with a variety of new (and changing) federal, state, and local health authority regulations encouraged the development of this document. Procedures should be performed in a manner that minimizes the risk of transmission of COVID-19. Evidence is sparse in certain areas regarding steps to reduce transmission risk. Even when limited evidence is available, it is not directly relevant to outpatient dermatology cosmetic procedures. Moreover, since individual cosmetic practices vary considerably, in terms of their typical patients, types of procedures performed, office physical plant, and other features, no detailed uniform guidance would be appropriate.

In general, it is recommended that patients and healthcare providers wear surgical masks when possible. Additionally, routine handwashing by healthcare providers is recommended. Beyond these recommendations, the evidence for enhancing infection control beyond what has always been practiced is uncertain to absent, and no strong recommendations can be made.

Please note that the following recommendations should be interpreted in light of any applicable rules and guidance in your jurisdiction. The ASDSA ([advocacy@asds.net](mailto:advocacy@asds.net)) has developed resources detailing the U.S. local, state and federal guidance/orders on elective and non-urgent procedures. ASDSA and ASLMS will make every reasonable effort to update the information contained in this resource as it becomes available. It does not constitute legal advice or substitute for medical decision-making.

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## **RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS**

*In each section below, a declarative statement in bold is followed by a grade of evidence and a strength of recommendation based on the GRADE framework. Explanatory text then follows. Strong recommendations may be relevant to most practitioners. Weak recommendations and options may be considered by certain practitioners in certain settings but are of uncertain benefit due to absent, very limited, or even contradictory evidence.*

*There is a significant possibility that future evidence may show weak recommendations to be unjustified. As such, weak recommendations should be viewed as options rather than recommendations and may or may not be considered by healthcare providers in particular situations. Even strong recommendations may be impractical or inappropriate in certain clinical circumstances. The treating healthcare practitioner is best qualified to decide what is best for patients and the clinical team.*

**It is recommended that patients and healthcare providers use masks to reduce risk of transmitting COVID-19. (GRADE level of evidence: moderate; strength of recommendation: strong).**

Pre-symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 transmission may occur through generation of respiratory droplets or indirect transmission. Speech and other vocal activities such as singing have been shown to generate air particles, with the rate of emission corresponding to voice loudness. In addition, a small fraction of individuals behave as “[speech superemitters](#),” who consistently release an order of magnitude more particles than their peers.<sup>1</sup> This may pose an inhalation threat even at considerable distances and in enclosed spaces, especially

those with [poor ventilation](#).<sup>2</sup> News outlets have reported that during a [choir practice](#) in Washington on March 10, [pre-symptomatic transmission](#) may have played a role in SARS-CoV-2 transmission to approximately 40 to 60 choir members.<sup>3,4</sup>

[Normal speaking](#) also produces thousands of oral fluid droplets with a broad distribution of size (1  $\mu\text{m}$  to 500  $\mu\text{m}$ ). Whereas large droplets fall quickly to the ground, small droplets can dehydrate and linger as droplet nuclei ( $\leq 5 \mu\text{m}$  in diameter) in the air, where they behave like an aerosol and thereby expand the spatial extent of emitted infectious particles.<sup>5</sup> These [particles](#) are of a size that may be inhaled into the lower respiratory tract ( $<5 \mu\text{m}$  in diameter).<sup>6</sup> Further, a new study in the journal *Cell* demonstrated that the highest angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE-2) expression was in the [nose](#) with decreasing expression levels throughout the lower respiratory tract, paralleled by a significant gradient of SARS-CoV-2 infection in proximal (high) vs. distal (low) pulmonary epithelial cultures.<sup>7</sup> High viral loads of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in [oral fluids](#) of COVID-19 positive patients<sup>8</sup>, including [asymptomatic](#) ones.<sup>9</sup> Leung recently showed that [surgical masks](#) can reduce coronavirus detection and viral copies in large respiratory droplets and in aerosols.<sup>10</sup> Jefferson et al demonstrated in a meta-analysis through six case-control studies that wearing [non-N95 masks](#) (0.32, 0.25-0.40; NNT=6, 4.54-8.03) was highly effective in preventing the spread of SARS-CoV-1.<sup>11</sup>

In 2003, a case-control study in five Hong-Kong hospitals, with 241 non-infected and 13 infected staff with documented exposures to 11 index patients with SARS-CoV-1 was performed. All participants were surveyed about use of mask, gloves, gowns, and hand-washing, as recommended under droplets and contact precautions when caring for patients with SARS. Sixty-nine staff who reported use of all four measures were not infected, whereas all infected staff had omitted at least one measure ( $p = 0.0224$ ). Fewer staff who wore masks ( $p = 0.0001$ ), gowns ( $p = 0.006$ ), and washed their hands ( $p = 0.047$ ) became infected compared with those who did not, and stepwise logistic regression was significant only for [masks](#) ( $p = 0.011$ ).<sup>12</sup>

Liang et al performed a systematic review and meta-analysis of literature examining the efficacy of [face masks](#) in preventing respiratory virus transmission was recently performed. A total of 21 studies were included. Meta-analyses suggested that mask use provided a significant protective effect (Odds Ratio, OR = 0.35, 95% CI = 0.24-0.51). Use of masks by healthcare workers and non-healthcare workers can reduce the risk of respiratory virus infection by 80% (OR = 0.20, 95% CI = 0.11-0.37) and 47% (OR = 0.53, 95% CI = 0.36-0.79), respectively. Interestingly, the protective effect of wearing masks in Asia (OR = 0.31) appeared to be higher than that of Western countries (OR = 0.45). Masks had a protective effect against influenza viruses (OR = 0.55), SARS (OR = 0.26), and SARS-CoV-2 (OR = 0.04). The authors noted that in the subgroups based on different study designs, protective effects of wearing masks were significant in cluster randomized trials, case-control studies, and retrospective studies. However, there continues to be a lack of ordinary RCTs (controlled, randomized, and blinded) regarding mask use, and hence none were included in this study. Further, there was insufficient data for subgroup analysis of [different mask types](#).<sup>13,14</sup>

Cheng et al assessed the effect of [community-wide mask usage](#) to control COVID-19 in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). The results showed that within the first 100 days (31 December 2019 to 8 April 2020), 961 COVID-19 patients were diagnosed in HKSAR. The COVID-19 incidence in HKSAR (129.0 per million population) was significantly lower ( $p < 0.001$ ) than that of Spain (2,983.2), Italy (2,250.8), Germany (1,241.5), France (1,151.6), U.S. (1,102.8), U.K. (831.5), Singapore (259.8), and South Korea (200.5). The compliance of face mask usage by HKSAR general public was 96.6% (range: 95.7%-97.2%). They observed 11 COVID-19 clusters in recreational 'mask-off' settings compared to only 3 in workplace 'mask-on' settings ( $p = 0.036$  by Chi square test of goodness-of-fit).<sup>15</sup>

In addition, a systematic review and meta-analysis of 4 randomized controlled trials offered lower certainty evidence that medical masks (also known as surgical masks) and N95 respirators offered similar

protection against viral respiratory infection including coronavirus in healthcare workers (HCWs) during [non-aerosol generating care](#).<sup>16</sup> In comparison, another recent systematic review and meta-analysis (that included data for SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, and MERS) found that face mask-use could result in a large reduction in risk of infection (n=2,647; aOR 0.15, 95% CI 0.07-0.34, RD -14.3%, -15.9 to -10.7; low certainty), with [stronger associations](#) with N95 or similar respirators compared with disposable surgical masks or similar (e.g., reusable 12–16-layer cotton masks;  $p_{\text{interaction}}=0.090$ ; posterior probability >95%, low certainty).<sup>17</sup>

A recent case report demonstrated the [effectiveness of masks and respirators for health care workers](#) who took care of a patient with severe pneumonia before the diagnosis of COVID-19 was confirmed.<sup>18</sup> Through contact tracing, 41 health care workers were identified as having had exposure to aerosol-generating procedures (e.g. endotracheal intubation, extubation, noninvasive ventilation) for at least 10 minutes at a distance of less than 2 meters from the patient. All 41 health care workers were placed under home isolation for 2 weeks. They had nasopharyngeal swabs scheduled on the first day of home isolation, which could have been day 1, 2, 4, or 5 after last exposure to patient, and a second swab scheduled on day 14 after their last exposure. None of the exposed health care workers developed symptoms, and all PCR tests were negative. All of the above described health care workers were either wearing a surgical mask or an N95 mask. Four HCWs were wearing surgical masks during endotracheal intubation, while 6 were wearing N95s. Two were wearing surgical masks during extubation, while no one wore an N95. Twenty-five HCWs wore surgical masks during non-invasive ventilation in the ICU or in a high-dependency unit, while 0 wore an N95. Finally, during oral suctioning/exposure to aerosols in an open circuit, four wore surgical masks while no one wore an N95.<sup>18</sup>

A recent pre-print further discussed the use of [homemade facemasks](#) during the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>19</sup> Generally available household materials had between a 49%-86% filtration rate for 0.02  $\mu\text{m}$  exhaled particles whereas surgical masks filtered 89% of those particles. In a laboratory setup, a [tea cloth mask](#) was found to filter 60% of particles between 0.02  $\mu\text{m}$  to 1  $\mu\text{m}$ , where surgical masks filtered 75%.<sup>20</sup> Dato et al designed and tested a mask made from [heavyweight T-shirts](#) and found that it "offered substantial protection from the challenge aerosol and showed good fit with minimal leakage".<sup>21</sup> Another pre-print showed, using laser-light scattering, that virtually no droplets were "expelled" with a [homemade mask](#) consisting of a washcloth attached with two rubber bands around the head, while significant levels were expelled without a mask.<sup>22</sup> Although cloth and surgical masks are primarily targeted towards droplet particles, some evidence suggests they may have a partial effect in reducing viral [aerosol shedding](#).<sup>23</sup>

Taken together, the above-mentioned results have important implications for the control of COVID-19, suggesting that surgical and homemade face masks could reduce onward transmission. It was estimated that at least 60% of the populations wore masks that were just 60% effective in blocking viral transmission (e.g. a well-fitting, two-layer cotton mask), the epidemic could be [significantly mitigated](#).<sup>19,24</sup>

**Physician and staff masking is recommended in particular for procedures near the nose and mouth as there is increased risk of contracting COVID from procedures at these sites (GRADE level of evidence: moderate; strength of recommendation: strong).**

**Procedures on the head and neck may be associated with increased risk of contracting COVID compared to procedures below the clavicle. (GRADE level of evidence: low; strength of recommendation: weak).**

**N95 respirators may be more effective than surgical masks for protection of patients and/or physicians during prolonged skin procedures that entail close contact with the patient's nose and mouth. (GRADE level of evidence: low; strength of recommendation: weak/option).**

The first reported physician fatality related to COVID-19 in Wuhan, China was that of an [otolaryngology physician](#) on 25 January 2020.<sup>25</sup>

Human-to-human spread occurs through respiratory secretions so health care personnel that manage patients with diseases of the [aerodigestive tract](#) (dentists, otolaryngologists, head and neck surgeons, gastroenterologists, pneumonologists, respiratory therapists, speech therapists, and infectious disease physicians) or ophthalmologists are the most susceptible health care workers to become infected (risk ratio of 2.13).<sup>26</sup>

There is currently no information regarding any potential risk for electrocautery smoke or transoral laser resection generated smoke but it would be reasonable to take appropriate precautions in these settings too.<sup>26</sup>

There are no studies of the effect on transmission of N95 masks versus standard surgical masks in dermatology or cosmetic dermatology procedures, or during other similar minor procedures in an office setting.

**Handwashing is recommended to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission (GRADE level of evidence: moderate; strength of recommendation: strong).**

SARS-CoV-2 is primarily transmitted through [respiratory droplets and aerosols](#); however, there is also potential for other routes of transmission including [body fluid routes, and oral-fecal transmission](#).<sup>27,28</sup> SARS-CoV-2 was recently shown to remain viable, on average, for approximately 6.8 hours on plastic surfaces and 5.6 hours on stainless steel surfaces, and viable virions were detected up to 72 hours after application to these surfaces, suggesting possible [fomite transmission](#).<sup>29</sup> However, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ([CDC](#)) states that even though it may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or possibly their eyes, they do not think this is the main way the virus spreads, but further studies are needed.<sup>30</sup>

A study performed in 2001 at a large Navy training center reported a 45% reduction in total outpatient visits for respiratory illness after implementation of a [handwashing program](#). Military trainees self-reported fewer respiratory illness episodes when compared to infrequent handwashers. The handwashing program consisted of directive from the commanding officer that recruits would wash hands at least 5 times daily, installation of liquid soap dispensers at all sinks in the training spaces, provision for the ongoing purchase of liquid handwashing soap, monthly education of drill instructors by preventive medicine personnel on the importance of handwashing, and monthly inspections of barrack spaces to include assessment of soap and sink availability, and to reinforce the handwashing message.<sup>31</sup> Jefferson et al demonstrated in a meta-analysis through six case-control studies that [handwashing](#) more than 10 times daily (odds ratio 0.45, 95% CI [0.36-0.57]; number needed to treat = 4, 95% CI [3.65-5.52]) was highly effective in preventing the spread of SARS-CoV-1.<sup>11</sup>

The CDC recommends washing your hands for at least [20 seconds](#).<sup>32</sup> This recommendation is based primarily on a study done for the food industry. Researchers placed a harmless strain of [Enterobacter aerogenes](#) on the hands of subjects and had them wash their hands in a controlled environment for various periods of time. When subjects washed their hands for 5 seconds, 97.6% of bacteria was removed. When they washed for 10 seconds, 99.3% was removed, at 20 seconds that increased to 99.7%, and at 40 seconds it actually dropped to 99.6%. While there was no statistically significant difference between washing for 10, 20, or 40 seconds, the recommendation was made for 20 seconds.<sup>33</sup> Another study compared washing hands for 10 seconds to washing for 3 minutes. Interestingly they found that while washing for 10 seconds reduced bacteria significantly, washing for 3 minutes actually had significantly higher bacteria counts of naturally occurring bacteria than

washing for only 10 seconds. Researchers suggested that the [extended washing time](#) may have released bacteria otherwise not accessible to the swabbing technique.<sup>34</sup>

According to the CDC, washing your hands with soap and water is the best way to get rid of germs in the majority of the situations. However, if soap and water are not readily available, then [alcohol-based hand sanitizers](#) that contain at least 60% alcohol (located on product label) can be used.<sup>32</sup> In contrast, the [WHO](#) recommends these two alcohol-based sanitizer formulations to prevent the spread of general pathogen: 1. ethanol — 80% by volume (vol/vol), glycerine (also known as glycerol) — 1.45% vol/vol, hydrogen peroxide — 0.125% vol/vol and 2. isopropanol (also known as 2-propanol or isopropyl alcohol) — 75% vol/vol, glycerine — 1.45% vol/vol, hydrogen peroxide — 0.125% vol/vol.<sup>35</sup> Either way, it is important to note that [alcohol-based hand sanitizers](#) do not get rid of all types of germs and may not be as effective when hands are visibly soiled.<sup>32,36</sup>

### **It is unclear whether eye protection reduces risk of contracting or transmitting COVID-19. (GRADE level of evidence: low; strength of recommendation: weak)**

Theoretically, the [nasolacrimal system](#) can act as a conduit for viruses to travel from the upper respiratory tract and vice versa.<sup>37</sup> Hence, ocular tissue and fluid may represent a potential source of SARS-CoV-2. In a study conducted on 38 COVID-19 positive patients, 2 patients yielded positive findings for SARS-CoV-2 in their [conjunctival](#) as well as nasopharyngeal specimens.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, a small study of seventeen COVID-19 patients examined SARS-CoV-2 shedding in tears. A total of 64 samples were obtained over the study period, with 12, 28, and 24 samples obtained from the first, second, and third week of initial symptoms, respectively. Their results did not find any evidence of SARS-CoV-2 shedding in [tears](#) through the course of the disease.<sup>39</sup>

However, a recent preprint examined 10 postmortem eyes and five surgical samples of conjunctiva from patients who did not have the coronavirus. The post-mortem eyes and surgical specimens were analyzed for expression of ACE2 (the receptor for SARS-CoV-2) and TMPRSS2, a cell surface-associated protease that facilitates viral entry following the binding of the viral spike protein to ACE2. Across all [eye specimens](#), immunohistochemical analysis revealed expression of ACE2 in the conjunctiva, limbus, and cornea, with especially prominent staining in the superficial conjunctival and corneal epithelial surfaces. Surgical conjunctival specimens also showed expression of ACE2 in the conjunctival epithelium, especially prominent in the superficial epithelium, as well as the substantia propria. All eye and conjunctival specimens also expressed TMPRSS2. Finally, western blot analysis of protein lysates from human corneal epithelium obtained during refractive surgery confirmed expression of ACE2 and TMPRSS2. Together, these results indicate that ocular surfaces including the conjunctiva are susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV-2, and could serve as a portal of entry.<sup>40</sup>

At this time, there is no direct evidence from randomized trials that eye protection equipment alone prevents transmission of COVID-19. However, anatomically, the conjunctiva of the eye is easily exposed to infectious droplets and fomites during close contact with infected individuals and contaminated hands. A recent systematic review and meta-analysis (that included data for SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, and MERS) found that [eye protection](#) was associated with less infection (n=3713; aOR 0.22, 95% CI 0.12 to 0.39, RD -10.6%, 95% CI -12.5 to -7.7; low certainty).<sup>17</sup> Some respiratory viruses such as human adenovirus and avian influenza virus (H7) frequently cause highly infectious conjunctivitis or keratoconjunctivitis. Hence, the conjunctiva is proposed to be an important portal of entry for [respiratory viruses](#), while tear and conjunctival secretions may contain virus and [spread viral infection](#).<sup>41,42</sup>

On January 22, 2020, a Chinese respiratory specialist who visited Wuhan as a member of the national expert panel on pneumonia claimed that he was infected by SARS-CoV-2 despite being fully gowned with a protective suit and N95 respirator. His first clinical manifestation was [unilateral conjunctivitis](#), followed by fever and catarrhal symptoms 2 or 3 hours later. He postulated that SARS-CoV-2 probably first infected the conjunctiva, then spread and caused the viral pneumonia.<sup>37,43</sup> However, a retrospective cohort study that included an individual whose presenting symptom of SARS-CoV-2 was [conjunctivitis](#) showed that he had a negative conjunctival SARS-CoV-2 test. In addition, of the 63 COVID-19 positive patients included, only one had a positive conjunctival PCR result.<sup>44</sup>

Recent investigations have revealed that highly infectious human CoVs (mainly SARS-CoV and 2019-nCoV) are rarely detected by [RT-PCR](#) and never isolated by virus culture in tears and conjunctival secretions from SARS and COVID-19 patients. Hence, it is hard to assess the infectivity of tears and conjunctival secretions and their roles in virus transmission.<sup>37</sup>

**Size of procedure room may influence risk of contracting COVID, with larger rooms possibly associated with lower risk. (GRADE level of evidence: very low; strength of recommendation: weak/option).**

Recent work has demonstrated that exhalations, sneezes, and coughs are primarily made of a multiphase [turbulent gas cloud](#) that carries within it clusters of droplets on a continuum of droplet sizes. Given various combinations of an individual patient's physiology and environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature, the gas cloud and its payload of pathogen-bearing droplets of all sizes can travel 23 to 27 feet.<sup>45</sup>

Current CDC recommendations include staying at least [6 feet](#) away from other people.<sup>46</sup> However, this [6 foot rule](#) does not mean respiratory droplets cannot travel further.<sup>24</sup> Originally, public-health guidelines, in fact, set the at-risk distance at three feet based on experiences in [previous outbreaks](#).<sup>47</sup> However, during the SARS epidemic in 2002, after several cases documented more distant spread, the authorities doubled the at-risk distance from three to six feet.<sup>24</sup> In one instance, a man with SARS on a [three-hour flight](#) from Hong Kong to Beijing infected twenty-two people. Eight of the 23 passengers in the same row or three rows in front of the index patient fell ill. However, people seven rows away, around 18 feet, developed SARS too.<sup>48</sup> A systematic review and meta-analysis (that included data for SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, and MERS) found that transmission of viruses was lower with [physical distancing](#) of 1 m or more, compared with a distance of less than 1 m (n=10,736, pooled adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 0.18, 95% CI 0.09-0.38; risk difference [RD] -10.2%, 95% CI -11.5 to -7.5; moderate certainty); protection was increased as distance was lengthened (change in relative risk [RR] 2.02 per m;  $p_{\text{interaction}}=0.041$ ; moderate certainty).<sup>17</sup>

Given physical plant limitations, larger rooms may not be available, or such rooms may be impractical for particular procedures performed. Also, there are no studies of the beneficial effect, if any, of larger room size when patients and physicians are in close proximity or direct contact during a procedure. Please see below for additional information on forced air cooling and the use of HEPA filters.

**Longer patient contact time, including time in the procedure room and time spent in the waiting room, may increase risk of contracting COVID-19 (GRADE level of evidence: low; strength of recommendation: weak/option).**

Currently, we are still unsure of how long of an exposure is needed to infect another person. In a report published by the CDC, among the first ten patients with travel-related confirmed COVID-19 reported in the

U.S., a total of 445 people were identified who had close contact with one of the ten patients on or after the date of patients' symptom onset. Nineteen (4%) of the 445 contacts were members of a patient's household, and five of these 19 contacts continued to have household exposure to the patient with confirmed COVID-19 during the patient's isolation period; 104 (23%) were community members who spent [at least 10 minutes](#) within 6 feet of a patient with confirmed disease; 100 (22%) were community members who were exposed to a patient in a health care setting; and 222 (50%) were health care personnel. During the 14 days of active symptom monitoring, 54 (12%) close contacts developed new or worsening symptoms deemed by local public health authorities to be concerning for COVID-19 and were tested for SARS-CoV-2. Only two persons who were household members of patients with confirmed COVID-19 tested positive for SARS-CoV-2.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, less than 10 minutes of exposure to a COVID-19 patient makes spread unlikely. On the other hand, as mentioned previously, the [choir practice](#) in Washington was ninety minutes long.<sup>3</sup> Given an average incubation period of five days, [a single unchecked case](#) can lead to more than 20,000 infections, and a hundred deaths over two months.<sup>24</sup>

**Use of air suction/HEPA filters during procedures may reduce risk of contracting COVID. (GRADE level of evidence: moderate; strength of recommendation: weak/option).**

A study by Guo et al tested surface and air samples from an intensive care unit (ICU) and general coronavirus ward at Huoshenshan Hospital from Feb 19 to Mar 2 to detect evidence of SARS-CoV-2. Eight of 12 ICU air vent swabs (66.7%) tested positive, as did 1 of 12 (8.3%) general ward air vent swabs. In addition, COVID-19 aerosol was found near [air vents](#) (5/14 [25.7%]), in patient rooms (8/18 [44.4%]), and in the doctor's office area (1/8 [12.5%]), indicating that aerosolized virus was concentrated near and downstream of patients. However, the upstream area also posed a risk, and based on the detection of virus in the doctor's office, approximately 4 meters from patients.<sup>50</sup>

The filtering capacity of masks, respirators, and respirator cartridges is denoted by a letter and numeric value. Filters are marked as either N, R, or P. The filters marked N are not resistant to oil, R are somewhat resistant to oil, and P are strongly resistant to oil. The number associated with each filter denotes its filtering capacity for particles 0.3 microns in size. A respirator designated "95" filters at least 95% of particles 0.3 microns in size. A mask designated "99" filters at least 99% of particles 0.3 microns in size. A mask designated "100" filters at least 99.97% of particles 0.3 microns in size. Thus, respirators or masks with N95 filtering capacity are non-resistant to oil and are able to filter out 95% of 0.3-micron particles. These are considered the lowest level of approved respiratory protection for airborne SARS viruses by the Centers Disease Control and Prevention. In comparison, P100 filters are oil proof and filter 99.97% of 0.3-micron particles. They are considered the highest level of protection against SARS viruses by the CDC. The filters used within powered air purifying respirators (PAPRs) and controlled air-purifying respirator (CAPRs) are designated as [High-Efficiency Particulate Air \(HEPA\) filters](#). They filter out 99.97% of 0.3-micron particles and are considered equivalent to P100 level filters.<sup>51</sup>

A recent study found that in a cough from a healthy volunteer, there were two distinct types of droplets, large droplets (100–1000  $\mu\text{m}$  in diameter) and small droplets (1–10  $\mu\text{m}$ ), with the small droplets being much more prevalent. During speech, only the small droplets were found. Large droplets were observed to fall onto the ground rapidly. They also found that while the speed of the drops ranged from 2–7 m/s at the start of the cough, the visible large drops (typically 500  $\mu\text{m}$  in diameter) did not travel far before their trajectory bent down due to gravity and fell rapidly onto the ground within 1 second. Droplets coming from the nasal cavity were also investigated, and that with normal breathing, no droplets were detected above the background noise level (2.3 [SD 1.5] droplets, and 2.6 [1.7] droplets for nasal breathing). From a sneeze, they found mostly very large drops, originating from both the buccal and nasal cavities, that were not persistent. With simulated small droplets from a cough, in the best ventilated room, after 30 seconds, the number of droplets had halved, whereas



with no ventilation this took about 5 minutes. In a [poorly ventilated room](#), the number of droplets was halved in 1.4 min.<sup>52</sup>

The CDC recently posted guidelines for [office buildings](#), stressing the importance of improving ventilation in office buildings. The recommendations included: increasing the percentage of outdoor air (e.g. using economizer modes of HVAC operations) potentially as high as 100%, considering using natural ventilation (e.g. opening windows if possible and safe to do) to increase outdoor air dilution, increasing air filtration to high as possible (MERV 13 or 14), and considering using portable [HEPA fan/filtration systems](#) to enhance air cleaning, especially in higher risk areas.<sup>53,54</sup>

There are no studies of the benefits of PAPRs or similar units in reducing risk of contracting COVID in a dermatology setting, a cosmetic dermatology setting, or other comparable low-risk outpatient medical procedure settings. Moreover, these devices are expensive as well as cumbersome to wear and use and may impede or obstruct the technical performance of certain procedures.

**Use of upper-room germicidal ultraviolet (GUV) in the reception and during procedures may reduce risk of contracting COVID. (GRADE level of evidence: moderate; strength of recommendation: weak/option).**

Nardell and Nathavitharana have made the argument that [upper room disinfection by GUV](#) coupled with adequate ventilation can significantly reduce risk of contracting COVID-19.<sup>55</sup> In its most recent guidelines regarding office buildings, the CDC did state that [ultraviolet germicidal irradiation \(UVGI\)](#) could be considered as a supplement to help inactivate the virus.<sup>53</sup>

In general, there are two [UVGI strategies](#) for air disinfection: 1) installation into air handlers or ventilation ducts and 2) irradiation of the upper air zones of occupied spaces with shielding of the lower occupied spaces since UV is harmful to room occupants. Other strategies utilized in certain healthcare situations include in-room radiation of unoccupied spaces and occupied spaces (e.g. operating suites) when personnel have appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).<sup>56</sup>

Use of [UV](#) in HVAC systems may help but is not as immediate in treating air throughout a room.<sup>57</sup> Upper-room GUV may also reduce risks from breathing any viral plume during certain laser procedures. If careful application is utilized, [upper-room GUV](#) can be performed without an increase in the incidence of UV overexposure side effects including [eye and skin irritation](#), and be used in [public](#) and high-traffic areas such as waiting rooms.<sup>56,58-60</sup> The fixtures are typically mounted at least 7 ft above the ground, with at least 1 ft of space above the [fixture](#) for decontamination to occur. Upper-room GUV is typically recommended when ventilation rates are low, because when air change rates are greater than 6 per hour, it may be less effective in comparison to particle removal by ventilation because particles may have less residence exposure time to UV.<sup>56</sup>

**It is uncertain whether forced air-cooling during laser procedures increases risk of contracting COVID versus using contact cooling. (GRADE level of evidence: very low; strength of recommendation: weak/option).**

During January 26–February 10, 2020, an outbreak of 2019 novel coronavirus disease in an air-conditioned restaurant in Guangzhou, China, involved 3 family clusters. Virus transmission in this outbreak could not be explained by droplet transmission alone. The distances between patient A1 and persons at other tables, especially those at table C, were all >1 m. However, strong airflow from the air conditioner could have

propagated droplets from table C to table A, then to table B, and then back to table C. Thus, the airflow direction prompted by the [air-conditioned ventilation](#) was consistent with droplet transmission.<sup>61</sup>

In a clinical setting, it is also possible that directed airflow *away* from the procedure, the patient and the physician may conversely mitigate transmission risk. Neither forced airflow toward or away from personnel performing cosmetic procedures has been studied.

## **ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS**

*In each section below, a declarative statement in bold is followed by a level of evidence. In each case, no recommendation is provided. Explanatory text then follows.*

**Procedures of the skin and hair appear to have low risk of transmitting COVID (GRADE level of evidence: very low; strength of recommendation: none).**

A recent study in the Journal of Investigative Dermatology confirmed the presence of a high expression of ACE2 on [keratinocytes](#) in human skin indicating that percutaneous transmission may be a potential risk route for SARS-CoV-2 infection, especially in conditions characterized by skin barrier dysfunction.<sup>62</sup> In a case report of a digitate papulosquamous eruption occurring during a SARS-CoV-2 infection, a [skin biopsy](#) of one of the lesions was performed. RT-PCR of the fresh skin biopsy specimen was negative for SARS-CoV-2.<sup>63</sup> In a second case report of a diffuse fixed erythematous blanching maculopapular rash, PCR on a [whole-skin biopsy](#) specimen was negative for SARS-CoV-2.<sup>64</sup>

**There is no documented risk of contracting COVID-19 from exposure to blood during procedures. (GRADE level of evidence: very low; strength of recommendation: none).**

**There is no evidence to show that cautery increases risk of contracting COVID-19. (GRADE level of evidence: very low; strength of recommendation: none).**

**There is no evidence to show that ablative laser procedures increase risk of contracting COVID-19. (GRADE level of evidence: very low; strength of recommendation: none).**

It has been demonstrated that thermal disruption of viable human cells results in the release of carbon particles, virus, bacteria, deoxyribonucleic, and toxic gases in all [surgical plume](#), regardless of the energy source and in all types of surgical procedures except using lower-powered lasers.<sup>65</sup> This means that [aerosolized blood](#), bloodborne pathogens, and pathogens found in the blood or other secretions can forcefully be ejected when the cell disrupts, and become airborne.<sup>66</sup>

SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in [blood](#) and stool specimens, and SARS-CoV-2 virus has been isolated in cell culture from the stool of some patients, including a patient with pneumonia 15 days after symptom onset.<sup>67</sup>

A recent study by Corman et al examined the oral swabs, sputum, and blood samples of 18 patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection using RT-PCR testing. Whereas oral swabs or sputum from the lower respiratory tract tested RT-PCR positive in all patients, [RNAemia](#) was neither detected in 3 patients without symptoms nor in 14 patients with flu-like symptoms, fever, or pneumonia. The only patient with RNAemia suffered from acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and was artificially ventilated in an intensive care unit. Consequently,

they concluded that the risk for SARS-CoV-2 transmission through blood components in asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infected individuals appeared negligible, but further large-scale studies are needed.<sup>68</sup>

**There is no evidence to show that liposuction increases risk of contracting COVID-19. (GRADE level of evidence: very low; strength of recommendation: none).**

A recent article proposed that adipocytes and adipocyte-like cells, such as pulmonary lipofibroblasts, may play an important role in the pathogenic response to COVID-19. Expression of angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2 - the functional receptor for SARS-CoV-2) - is upregulated in [adipocytes](#) of obese and diabetic patients, which turns adipose tissue into a potential target and viral reservoir.<sup>69</sup>

### *Disclaimer*

*The guidance presented within this document is limited by present medical and scientific understanding of COVID-19. Therefore, any future changes in such understanding will need to be evaluated by healthcare providers in determining their continued utility. Due to the complexity and rapidly changing nature of the present circumstances, no declarations can be made in regard to when a procedure may be restarted in general practice. Many procedures considered “cosmetic” are also performed for medical reasons, which affects timing and recommendations in accordance with state/federal guidelines.*

*The information provided in this document is intended for use by expert medical providers, who must decide what is best for their patients. No information in this document should be construed to imply restrictions on when and how healthcare providers can provide care. Medical care is an essential service and should be available to all patients who can benefit. At times, there may be reasons to change the process of care delivery to best meet patient needs, and how this is done, and whether such changes are made are at the discretion of the treating medical provider, in consultation with the patient.*

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